Forgetting Foucault? Anonymity, death and the author by Wain, Kenneth
Education (Malta) Vol. 5 N 2 2, 1994 pp. 13-21 
Forgetting Foucault? 
Anonymity, Death and the Author 
The title 'Forgetting Foucault?', minus the ques-
tion mark (a very important omission, of course), is 
one I have borrowed from Baudrillard's famous paper 
of 1980 which tries to cut Foucault's thesis about 
power\knowledge down to size but fails to tell us 
exactly why Foucault should be forgotten'. 1 Racevskis 
describes the Baudrillard article as 'a fairly abstruse 
poetico-philosophic essay that indicts Foucault for 
collusion with prevailing myth-making strategies. 
Foucault,' Racevskis continues, 'is shown by 
Baudrillard to have become infatuated with the imagi-
nary force of his own discourse, and his genealogy is 
depicted as a system satisfying a certain hegemonic 
logic of reason. '2 In effect, not only has Foucault not 
been forgotten, the contrary is the case; a Foucault 
industry has grown over the ten years since his death 
with a Centre for Foucauldian Studies set up in Paris. 
What were Foucault's own views about his posterity? 
Why would Baudrillard want us to forget Foucault and 
what is this continuing presence his memory consti-
tutes? 
The second question perhaps could be the 
subject of a hermeneutical study of Baudrillard's pa-
per; Racevskis reads it as 'confrontation', as 'a violent 
challenge to the principal tenets of Foucault's episte-
mology' which 'attempts to turn on its head its implicit 
claim to radicalism. '3 This analysis is not something I 
want to do here though, undoubtedly, the exercise 
would be an interesting one; the subject of this paper 
is not Baudrillard. Instead I want to turn to the first 
question and the part of the second which takes us into 
debate on the subject of 'continuing presence' of the 
'figure' and, thus, into the heart of the question 
whether Foucault should be forgotten or remem-
bered, and why? Perhaps one could couch the ques-
tion of his 'presence' in terms of the enduring power 
of Foucault and of his writings?! About this subject, the 
subject of the author in relation to the text, particularly 
about 'anonymity' there is much that Foucault has 
said or written, much which could also be germane to 
the question about how he regarded his own posterity. 
At the same time, Baudrillard's thesis about 
Foucault is undoubtedly odd, for Foucault has rarely 
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ever been characterised as a conservative, though 
Habermas who labeled him a postmodernist and 
accused him of being against reason did start a trend 
in that direction. 4 Indeed, the more usual way of 
depicting Foucault is as an anarchist, or even a nihilist. 5 
In one of the interviews he gave, Foucault himself 
interrupted his interviewer Gerard Roulet, who was 
going on about how 'Habermas has taken up this term 
in order to criticize it in all its aspects ... ', the term, of 
course, was 'postrnodernity', with the question (tongue-
in cheek? At any rate Roulet took it seriously and 
answered it exhaustively): 'What are we calling post-
modernity? I'm not up to date?'6 Foucault complained 
that even the term 'modernity' perplexed him. 7 Nor, 
he said, did he see any 'disappearance of reason' 
occurring - 'I can see multiple transformation, but I 
cannot see why we should call all this transformation 
a collapse of reason. '8 
At the same time an 'epistemology' is precisely 
one thing Foucault claimed not to have, even if 
Archeology of Knowledge (regarded by many as 
having been Foucault's least successful book) did 
represent archeology as the 'successor subject' to 
epistemology. The force of Rorty's criticism in this case 
was that Foucault was still perpetuating a hegemonic 
tradition originating with the Enlightenment which 
views philosophy as the foundation of culture. But 
Rorty then refers approvingly to the later Foucault's 
Nietzschean turn to genealogy which, in its negativity, 
cannot certainly be characterised as an epistemology 
or a method. 9 At the same time, Baudrillard was not 
referring to the Foucault of the Archeology when he 
accused him of hegemonic intentions but precisely to 
his genealogy. 
But the truth is that Foucault was, from the 
beginning, as much against hegemonies, against the 
imperialism of 'method', as are Rorty and Baudrillard. 
Hence his rapid abandonment of the method of 
archeology. Rorty lauds genealogy because it is nega-
tive rather than positive. In other words it has nothing 
to do with setting up theories or searching for 'origins' 
or with discovering an episteme within an archive, as 
does archeology. It has to do instead with 'unmask-
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ing', with the tracing out of 'descent' and 'emergence' 
(two Nietzschean metaphors) of some regime of 
knowledge\power. As an analysis of descent, geneal-
ogy, Foucault says, is 'situated within the articulation 
of the body and history. Its task is to expose a body 
totally imprinted by history and the process of history's 
destruction of the body. ' 10 Emergence, on the other 
hand is about 'the moment of arising'; it 'seeks to 
establish the various systems of subjection; not the 
anticipatory power of meaning, but the hazardous 
play of domination '11 - it is, therefore, about 'struggle'. 
But, Foucault says, about that struggle, 'no one can 
glory in it, since it always occurs in the interstice'. 12 Is 
the interstice where one finds Foucault? Does his 
'negative' genealogy, indeed, qualify him as an anar-
chist or even nihilist? Would Foucault himself want to 
be remembered as such? 
Let us put aside Baudrillard's challenge for the 
time being and ask, which would be the best way to 
remember Foucault? The question is evidently an 
ambiguous one; in one sense it could be about method, 
in another it could be about approach or style within 
a particular method, in another still it could be about 
characterisation, about how to actually represent 
Foucault. Methodologically, one obvious way to re-
member someone is, indeed, to do what I am doing 
now, namely write a paper about him/her. There are 
obviously other possibilities also {like having a soiree 
or a service, or opening a prestigious centre of studies, 
like the one in Paris, with an international conference), 
but writing about a writer seems the best way to 
remember him/her, and Foucault himself privileged 
writing above other forms of expression. The more 
interesting question seems to be, how does one go 
about the business of writing aboutF oucault? Maclntyre 
argues that the lecture is an inappropriate way to 
remember genealogists, who all, including the earliest 
among them Nietzsche, feel rather uncomfortable 
playing the role of philosophy professors. 13 Genealo-
gists are happier writing narratives and aphorisms than 
philosophical papers, happier telling anecdotes and 
stories rather than giving lectures. But Foucault was a 
bad genealogist in this sense, for he continued to give 
courses, like any other philosophy professor, at the 
College de France, until the end of his life. Nor were 
aphorisms and anecdotes his preferred mode of writ-
ing, though he could, on the other hand, nay should, 
be described as a writer of narratives. 
A universally acknowledged way of writing 
about an author is to do a critical study of his or her 
works, and Foucault, in this respect, has had more 
than his fair share of critical studies. But is writing a 
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critical study of his work the way he would have 
wanted to be approached? How about writing a 
biographical sketch of his life? Of course, it could 
always be argued that it is irrelevant what he would 
have thought about the matter. That response, how-
ever, whoever it is made about, counts only for those 
who may not feel the figure of a writer, a writer's 
presence; those who simply see the writer as a piece 
of public property to be appropriated and put aside, or 
who cannot relate to the writer in any personal way; 
those who merely see the writer as a subject for study 
or entertainment but who do not feel any presence in 
his or her works. If one feels the presence of the author 
one is also respectful of that author's opinion. Writing 
a critical work on Foucault is treating him as a subject 
for analysis, finally it is coming up with a theory about 
him and about his work. Writing his biography is telling 
a narrative about his life something he himself repeat-
edly refused to discuss. In either case, one is trying to 
pin him down, make him more accessible to oneself 
and to an audience. Perhaps a good clue to the 
question of how one should write about Foucault, if 
one wants to write about him in his own terms, would 
be to see how he himself wrote to 'remember' an-
other, dead, author, Raymond Roussel, though the 
situation is not the same since Roussel, at least at the 
time Foucault wrote about him, was a relatively ob-
scure writer?! 14 Perhaps one could write a genealogy 
of Foucault?! 
It turns out, in fact, that one of the difficulties of 
remembering Foucault in writing lies in deciding how 
one should write about him. In a sense, this is not 
simply the problern with Foucault, it occurs with all 
authors who somehow have the power to retain a 
presence, who somehow seem to live as strongly 
outside their work as they do within it. Foucault 
himself was certainly interested in the question why 
we need to retain any kind of presence at all, any 
'figures' in our culture, particularly why we have an 
interest in retaining the figure of an author. And I 
could, of course, since this is precisely what I am doing, 
writing about an author, turn the question on myself. 
Why am I writing about Foucault? Maybe because I 
find Baudrillard 's suggestion that we should forget him 
intriguing? Or maybe because the tenth anniversary of 
his death is a good excuse to write a paper about a 
writer who is still very popular (or, at any rate, whose 
name is still very popular)? Maybe, I am one of those 
who harbours a hidden ambition to pin him down, to 
respond to his own challenge, to the gauntlet he seems 
to throw down to the reader!? Responding to these 
questions would mean v;riting not about Foucault but 
about myself! Maybe I should write what I think my 
prospective readers would want to know about him? 
But that would involve me in a hermeneutic of the 
reader which assumes, in turn, that I know the reader. 
his/her interests and motives, which I do not, or that 
the reader is, at least accessible to me, which s/he is 
not. 
I could speculate that some readers would want 
to know about him, personally, as a personage, as a 
figure. Others may be more interested in what he 
wrote and what he said, what his views and concerns 
were about different things. Yet the question arises, 
but why do you want to know these things? And what, 
of what he wrote and said, would you regard as 
relevant to his memory? Maybe you want to hear 
about Foucault' s work because you think that you will 
find it interesting, or uplifting, or enlightening, or 
different, or because it will add to your knowledge of 
contemporary philosophy, or because it will add to 
your intellectual baggage, or maybe because you are 
just curious? Those of you who are students may only 
want to know more about Foucault because his works 
are prescribed for your course of studies, in which case 
you would be particularly interested in the question 
whether he is worth remembering as an assessment of 
his worth! This is a not a good motive. though it may 
be a pragmatic one. What about curiosity? Is that a 
good motive? What kind of curiosity is curiosity about 
a writer? 
Whatever the answer, curiosity about Foucault 
is very understandable. After all, over the years, he has 
become a celebrity, a canonical figure of academic 
and intellectual life; knowing Foucault, or at least 
knowing something about him, is still very academi-
cally and intellectually up-market. In some corner of 
some seminar about him one is almost bound to hear 
someone whisper, maybe even loudly, "perhaps to 
show-off some familiarity with his name. that 'Foucault 
died of aids didn't he?' How does that fact, or any 
other fact about how an author dies, affect how he or 
she is remembered, or whether he or she should be 
remembered? 
One may ask a similar kind of question about. 
say, Van Gogh. Why is it that someone like Van Gogh 
continues to fascinate so many people? Is it simply the 
quality of his work that does it? Is it the eccentric 
creativity of his expressiveness that fascinates? Or is it 
his eccentric 'life'? I am thinking, for instance. about 
the numerous films made about Van Gogh 's life. Van 
Gogh is another who. like Foucault. retains a pres-
ence. As with Foucault's sexuality (Foucault himself 
pronounced sex boring!) what fascinates many with 
Van Gogh is, of course, his madness. I am sure that at 
one time people must have whispered that Van Gogh 
committed suicide in the same tone of hushed awe or 
sensationalistic matter-of-factness tpat some people 
use today when they refer to Foucault's 'aids'. 
But nobody really needs to worry about having 
any alibis, of being accused of sheer curiosity by the 
ghost of Foucault. Why would Foucault worry that 
people want to know about him out of sheer curiosity? 
Did he not himself, after all, describe hi-s own interest 
in life and in philosophy as a matter of curiosity?! To 
what extent do the circumstances of his or her life 
contribute towards our evaluation of an author? Would 
it have made a difference to the way we regard his 
work had Van Gogh not been mad and committed 
suicide, or Pollock an alcoholic who smashed himself 
in a car? Would it make any difference if Foucault 
really did die of a brain turner after all - except. in a 
technical sense, that is? And, to return to the question, 
why should the motivation of the reader be any more 
important than my own motivation as a writer in 
determining how I should write about Foucault? 
In his own writing about the relationship be-
tween arfand madness. in the early years of his career 
as an author, Foucault said: "It is of little importance on 
exactly which day in the autumn of 1888 Nietzsche 
went mad for good. and after which his texts no longer 
afford philosophy but psychiatry: all of them. includ-
ing the postcard to Strindberg, belong to Nietzsche, 
and are all related to The Birth of Tragedy. But we 
must not think of this continuity in terms of a system, 
of a thematics, or even of an existence: Nietzsche's 
madness- that is, the dissolution of his thought- is that 
by which his thought opens out onto the modern 
world. ' 15 The interesting paradox Foucault was to 
return to again and again throughout his life is already 
at work in this passage; the identification of authorship 
with the life of the author goes together with the 
necessity of the author's dissolution through the act of 
authorship itself. Nietzsche's madness needs to be 
considered as his 'opening out onto the (modern) 
world'. But must madness be the filter through which 
the author opens out in this way? How does Foucault 
himself' open out', since he was not mad? Where does 
Foucault open out onto the (modern/postmodern?) 
world? Through his homosexuality? Why did the 
author of The History of Sexuality pronounce sex 
boring? 
What does Foucault understand by author-
ship? This is. indeed. the question. In his essay on the 
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subject of the author, he asks what should be ascribed 
to Nietzsche as author: 'what about the drafts of his 
works?' he asks, 'Obviously. The plans of his apho-
risms? Yes. The deleted passages and the notes at the 
bottom of the page? Yes. What is, within a workbook 
filled with aphorisms, one finds a reference, the nota-
tion of a meeting or of an address, or a laundry list: Is 
it work, or not? Why not? And so on, ad infinitum. 
How can one define a work amid the millions of traces 
left by someone after his death ?'16 It seems impossible, 
then, to do a genealogy of the author because gene-
alogy 'requires patience and a knowledge of details, 
and it depends on a vast accumulation of source 
material'Y But what is the source material for a 
genealogy of a dead author and how do we accumu-
late it, and when do we know that we have accumu-
lated enough? This is the issue Foucault is raising here 
for those who would want to remember an author. In 
short, doing a genealogy of Foucault as an author does 
not seem on, at least on his own terms! 
But, is this not also the case, then, for writing his 
biography?! How does one write Foucault's biogra-
phy, supposing one elected, in fact, to remember him 
by writing his biography? Maybe what is interesting 
about the writing of biographies about authors, par-
ticularly authors who are also figures, is not what they 
tell us about the authors but what they tell us about 
ourselves. This being the case. I don't think one can 
simply ignore the question raised a bit earlier; why do 
we want to retain the presence of an author at all? Why 
is the biography of an author more important for us 
than the biography of John Smith? Why is the figure 
of the author required in our culture, why isn't the 
work enough? Is it a good sign if, say, in our culture, 
having moved away from a hegemony of theories and 
epistemologies we are now moving towar:ds a he-
gemony of personalities, of figures, of heroes, and 
what would that 'moving away' mean to us? Are 
biographies, some of which have already appeared, 
the way Foucault would have wanted to be remem-
bered, supposing he really wanted to be remem-
bered? For it may well be the case that Foucault 
actually agreed with Baudrillard! That Foucault him-
self wanted us to forget Foucault. .. ! 
This thought struck me as I was reading Walzer' s 
fortuitous comparison of Foucault with Kafka. Kafka 
left instructions with his friend Max Brod to destroy his 
work when he was dead. It most certainly seems that 
Kafka wanted to be forgotten otherwise why leave 
such instructions? Or did he want to be forgojen? 
'Foucault is not the Kafka of the prison or the asylum; 
his account is neither surreal nor mysterious. 'lH Evi-
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dently Walzer mentions the two together by way of 
contrast rather than comparison and in a very different 
context of discussion from the one I am pursuing. But 
the comparison of Foucault with Kafka on this point is 
intriguing. It would appear to have made no sense for 
the already much published and much publicised 
Foucault to have repeated Kafka's gesture. Foucault 
himself specifically took up Kafka 's gesture in associa-
tion with Roussel. Roussel left a posthumous book 
'How I wrote Certain of My Books' which held forth 
the tantalising suggestion of a hidden 'secret' in his 
work; a trap to lure the reader. In fact, whatever else 
it was that Roussel wanted in life it was certainly not 
anonymity. Foucault comments. 'In a way, Roussel's 
attitude is the reverse of Kafka's, but as difficult to 
interpret. Kafka had entrusted his manuscripts to Max 
Brod to be destroyed after his death - to Max Brod, 
who had said he would never destroy them. Around 
his death Roussel organized a simple explanatory 
essay which is made suspect by the text, his other 
books, and even the circumstances of his death'. 19 
Roussel's 'tantalising secret' was his way of ensuring 
his immortality! But Foucault himself, like Kafka, 
expressed the wish for anonymity while he was alive! 
As early as 1969, in fact, he was saying things 
like, 'I am no doubt not the only one who writes if! 
order to have no face. Do not ask who lam and do not 
ask me to remain the same: leave it to our bureaucrats 
and our police to see that our papers are in order. At 
least spare us their morality when we write. '20 How 
serious was he about 'writing to have no face'? In 
effect, throughout his career he deliberately and noto-
riously made the business of pinning him down, of 
characterising him in any way, difficult, by constantly 
shifting position, by constantly affirming his privacy 
and his unwillingness to be taken for granted, by 
constantly revising the state of his oeuvre, re-describ-
ing it in different ways, sometimes radically, in terms of 
the current focus of his work and of the methodology 
he was using, his archeology his genealogy, his ethics. 
by writing in a manner that carried him through the 
fields of philosophy, cultural history, sociology, medi-
cal history, and literary criticism. 
Thus, Madness and Civilization (1961), was 
about 'return(ing), in history, to the zero point in the 
course of madness at which madness is an 
undifferentiated experience, a not yet divided experi-
ence of division itself. '21 It was an archeological search 
for' origins'. In 1977 he said, 'When I think back now, 
I ask myself what else it was that I was talking about, 
in Madness and Civilisation or The Birth of the Clinic 
but power?'22 ln 1981. he proclaimed that 'The goal of 
my work during the last twenty years has not been to 
analyse the phenomena of power, nor to elaborate the 
foundations of such analysis. My objective, instead, 
has been to create a history of the different modes by 
which, in our culture, human beings are made sub-
jects. '23 
In his very last interview before he died, asked 
whether, in view of his recent courses on the 
hermeneutic of the subject 'your present philosophi-
cal research is still determined by the poles, subjectiv-
ity and truth.' He replied that 'in fact this has always 
been my problem, even if I have expressed in different 
terms the framework of this thought. I have tried to 
discover how the human subject entered into games 
of truth, whether they be games of truth which take on 
the form of science or which refer to a scientific model, 
or games of truth like those that can be found in 
institutions or practices of control. '24 On being asked 
whether there is any complementarity between 
power\knowledge, the axis of relationships that had 
engrossed him in his earlier work, and subject/truth, 
which was his present interest, he explains how he 
sees the assimilation of his former work, including his 
work on power/ knowledge within his central project 
of narrating how the subject enters into a certain game 
of truth. 
At all times one must come to terms with a 
deliberately elusive Foucault; one who is changing 
tack, sometimes out of sheer devilry, all the time, 
deliberately laying a false track, refusing to stand still 
long enough to be labeled or, as Walzer put it (though 
Foucault first used the metaphor for himself), 'situated 
on the chessboard of available positions', consciously, 
disconcertingly perverse. Rorty' s ideal figure, in effect, 
of the ironic 'strong misreading poet'? Perhaps, nev-
ertheless, the truth is that the Foucault who taunted his 
reader in Archeology of Knowledge with 'No, no, I'm 
not where you are lying in wait for me, but over here, 
laughing at you,' actually found it necessary periodi-
cally to identify continuity in his work, to focus it in 
some way. 25 Couzens Hoy interprets this tendency in 
this way: 'Foucault himself continually reflects on his 
own development and offers his own interpretations 
of it, often with honest self-criticisms. '26 But how does 
this periodic rationalisation of his work's 'progress', 
this need to see his work over time as consistent, 
coherent, developmental, cohere with the anarchic, 
literary, Foucault - the strong poet? Why was he so 
intent on viewing his work as a project? There seems 
to be another paradox at work here somewhere! My 
view is that it is only explained through understanding 
what he meant by 'ethics'. 
In the foreward to the 1970 English edition of 
The Order of Things Foucault complained bitterly 
against 'certain half-witted commentators' in France 
who had dubbed him a structuralist, though, at that 
time, some aspects of his work very evidently were 
so. u One feels the sheer annoyance behind his terse 
statement. Subsequently he was to insist repeatedly in 
his interviews that he was never a structuralist, or 
indeed a Freudian or Marxist. Why? 
In The Order of Things Foucault went one 
better than his mentor Nietzsche in predicting not the 
death of God but that of man. He augured, in the very 
last lines of the book, 'that man would be erased, like 
a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea. '28 What did 
he mean by that? In effect. what it sounds like is an 
echo of Heidegger's pronouncement about the end of 
'humanism·. the postmodernist sounding the death 
knell for modernity's anthropocentric culture. It ac-
cords with Rorty's observation that what is really at 
issue in this version of anti-humanism is not so much 
the idea that culture should be centred in 'man· but, 
more radically, whether it needed any 'centre' at all, in 
'God', 'Science', 'man' or in anything else. Foucault's 
response to it was typically radical - the process of 
cutting the king's head had to be complete every-
where not just in politics. and the head of the 'author' 
had to fall with the rest; it had also to be erased by the 
sea. Thearcheological'structuralism' ofhisworkatthe 
time. which projected discourse as something autono-
mous and self-sufficient. probably satisfied that anti-
humanistambition. His disclaimer against being labeled 
a structuralist was no reflection on structuralism on his 
part, any more than his rejection of the label of 
Freudian or Marxist was part of any polemic he had 
against Freud or,Marx. His problem wasn't with any of 
these positions as such it was, as I said earlier, with 
being situated in any position at all, with being turned 
into 'a subject' by anyone but himself! 
At the same time, one feels inclined to question 
Foucault's motives in claiming to want anonymity. 
What is its true explanation? Is the claim to anonymity 
the renouncement of the hegemony of the author as 
I have just suggested, or the tongue in cheek buffoon-
ery of one who knows full well that anonymity is the 
very last thing he could claim for himself, one won-
ders? He who had even made the front cover of Time 
Magazine, who had granted interviews almost indis-
criminately to other popular journals, who had en-
couraged his own presence with every means attain-
able? Was it because he knew, in effect, that it would 
be impossible to forget him that he claimed to want 
anonymity? How serious. in short. was Foucault about 
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his anonymity? If Kafka's real desire for anonymity is 
in doubt what about Foucault' s? In effect, it is interest-
ing that Foucault did, eventually, imitate Kafka's ges-
ture. In 1977, he told a friend (Jean Pierre Barou) 
'When I die, I will leave no manuscripts, and when he 
was actually close to death, he ordered another close 
friend, Herve Guibert, to destroy the drafts of the final 
volumes of The History of· Sexuality and all the 
preparatory material connected with them. Foucault. 
in fact, appears to have had little sympathy with Brod 's 
decision to preserve Kafka's manuscripts against the 
writer's wishes and himself expressed the wish, in his 
last note, for no posthumous publications. 
Yet one cannot avoid the suspicion of 
Zarathustrean irony whenever one deals with Foucault! 
Even with his final acts. Particularly since, in this 
instance, he could not have been insensitive to the 
popular acclaim he had received as Sartre 's successor, 
as philosophical guru, as 'the superstar of French 
thought'; the 'intellectual' par excellence29 
But, the word intellectual strikes me as odd,' 
he once responded to a question by an interviewer. 
'Personally I've never met any intellectuals. 'Writers, 
painters, doctors, teachers, composers, economists', 
he says, tongue in cheek, he's met, and 'people of 
whom I have never really understood what they do. 
But intellectuals, never. On the other hand, I've met a 
lot of people who talk about "the intellectual",' he 
adds, on a sinister note. But listening to them is not 
very reassuring because they blame the intellectual for 
pretty much everything: 'And I catch a glimpse of a 
radiant city in which the intellectual would be in prison 
or, if he were also a theoretician, hanged. of course. 
We don't, its true, live in a regime in which intellectuals 
are sent to the rice fields. But have you heard of a 
certain T oni Negri? Isn't he in prison simply for being 
an intellectua!?'30 This is, again, the disconcerting 
Foucault; the 'unmasking' Foucault who is seeking out 
motives and who discovers them in the exercise of 
domination over a self. The Foucault who would ask 
us, as I indicated earlier, what are your motives for 
wanting to remember me? Don't you mean your 
biographies and critical studies to discipline me?' 
But in an entirely different mood from this one, 
and in other interviews, Foucault expressed his pref-
erence for the 'specific' intellectual, the individual 
pragmatically fighting out specific battles within con-
tained contexts of power, in the 'interstices'. 'where 
their own conditions of life and work situate them', in 
his/her own name, as opposed to the 'universal' 
intellectual with emancipatory 'theories' about justice 
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and right, speaking for a collectivity. 31 
But fighting for what? The question finally leads 
up to the complaint which led his critics to classify him 
an anarchist. Foucault, as I said earlier, would identify 
himself with no political position, would admit to no 
allegiance. Since he didn't even have a theory of 
freedom to contrast the appropriation of the self he 
unmasked with, what did he want us to fight for? What 
is there to fight for without some vision of emancipa-
tion, of a better life and a better world? It was pretty 
clear what he wanted us to fight against; the 'normali-
zation' of the self through the different forms of bio-
power typical of modern life was his great quarry; the 
objectifying and su bjectifying processes that turn the 
individual into a 'subject'. the panopticon society with 
its gulag type institutions justified, galvanised, and 
rendered more efficient by the human and social 
sciences. We also know which battles he fought as a 
specific intellectual, against the penal, mental, and 
other disciplinary institutions of our times. Walzer 
comments .that 'Foucault's political theory is a "tool 
kif' not for revolution but for local resistance'. 32 Walzer 
is also critical of Foucault because 'despite his empha-
sis on local struggles, he is largely uninterested in local 
victories. '33 This is broadly what causes him to charac-
terize Foucault a nihilist. Did he need a theory of 
freedom or emancipation for his fight? Can one fight 
without such a theory? 'I've always been a little 
distrustful of the general theme of liberation', he says 
elsewhere. The danger, he continues, is that the 
discourse of liberation can lead to the belief in the 
existence of 'a human foundation which, as a result of 
a certain number of historical. social or economic 
processes. found itself concealed, alienated or impris-
oned in and by some repressive mechanism'. 34 
Rorty argues that there is an alternative to 
having theories of emancipation; writing utopian nar-
ratives.35 In Foucault's case. however. the narratives. 
or 'fictions' he relates are purely dystopian. Madness 
and Civilization, The Birth of the Clinic, and, most 
particularly Discipline and Punish, could easily fit 
within this genre together with the classics of dystopia n 
writing. As Walzer himself admits with reference to 
these works, 'it is impossible to read them, whatever 
disagreements one has. without a sense of recogni-
tion. '36 Put in another way, Foucault' s narratives 
'disconcert'. 37 As Couzens Hoy also points out, 
'Foucault paints the picture of a totally normalised 
society, not because he believes our present society is 
one, but because he hopes we may find the picture 
threatening. '38 Is the dystopian writer who disconcerts 
but refuses to project an alternative utopia necessarily 
a nihilist? I think not. Is Foucault a nihilist. that's 
another question. 
Isn't 'nihilist' simply one more label to be 
rejected for Foucault? It is time to return to the 
question: isn't 'author' itself, innocuous as it may 
sound, a label Foucault would have wanted to reject? 
Is the honest yen for anonymity compatible with 
authorship? Can the 'particular' intellectual claim for 
him/herself the role of author? Roussel' s major preoc-
cupation was to be remembered. to be a figure. an 
author. Foucault doubts Kafka's honesty with Max 
Brad when the former asked for his writings to be 
destroyed. Many of Foucault's own views about a 
variety of things were expressed in the interviews that 
he gave rather than in his writings. Today, these 
interviews are included in a number of printed collec-
tions as part of his general oeuvre; i.e., they are treated 
as writings. The transient quality of the interview is 
thus subverted. Indeed, there are no signs thatFoucault 
was ever moving away from being a writer first and 
foremost. 
In the interview I referred to earlier Foucault's 
reply to the question about his continuing wish for 
anonymity was that 'in our societies. characters domi-
nate our perceptions. Our attention,' he continued, 
'tends to be arrested by the activities of faces that come 
and go, emerge and disappear. Why did I suggest that 
we use anonymity?' he continues, 'Out of nostalgia for 
a time when, being quite unknown, what I said had 
some chance of being heard. With the potential reader, 
the surface contact was unrippled. The effects of the 
book might land in unexpected places and form 
shapes that I had never thought of. A name makes 
reading too easy. '39 Did he have his own relationship 
with Roussel in mind when he was saying these 
words? Probably. The wish to assert oneself as an 
author, he went on to suggest, proceeds from the 
author's own vanity. 
Less than nine months before he died Foucault 
was interviewed about his book on Raymond Roussel. 
The surrealist writer died in 1933, roughly, as it turned 
out, when he was of the same age as Foucault himself 
when he died. 40 The book itself is not one of the most 
referred to in the literature on Foucault, as he himself 
remarks. But the interview, printed with the English 
version of the book provides a clue about a way he 
would have liked to be remembered which is. at the 
same time, compatible with this wish for anonymity. 
Foucault says that curiosity was what first made him 
interested in Roussel, whom he had never heard of 
until195 7. He became curious about the writer when 
he picked up one of his books by chance while he was 
waiting to be served in a book shop: ·I was like all other 
students of philosophy at that time, and for me the 
break was first Beckett's Waiting for Godot, a breath-
taking performance'. 41 
Beckett was followed, Foucault says, by other 
novelists and writers, but, clearly, Beckett's play re-
mained especially significant for him! Meanwhile, hark-
ing us back to some of the comments I made earlier, 
Foucault was asked in his interview whether it was 
Roussel's psychological problems' (Roussel was con-
stantly under the influence of drugs and had at-
tempted suicide not long before his mysterious death) 
that had attracted him to the writer. He answered no, 
though, in effect, in the book itself he had made a lot 
of Roussel's 'madness'. 'The private life of an indi-
vidual,' he continued to say in the interview, 'his 
sexual preference, and his work are interrelated not 
because his work translates his sexual life, but because 
the work includes the whole life as well as the text.' 
Then he went on, in a manner again reminiscent of his 
earlier comments about Nietzsche in Madness and 
Civilization, 'the work is more than the work: the 
subject who is writing is part of the work. '42 'The 
subject of the writing is part of the work'! 
In the first page of 'What is an Author?', Foucault 
quotes a line from Beckett's play which, he says, 
'formulates the theme' of the author for him The line 
goes: "'What does it matter who is speaking", some-
one said, "what does it matter who is speaking." In this 
indifference,' Foucault continues, 'appears one of the 
fundamental ethical principles of contemporary writ-
ing'. Foucault continues to explain why he uses the 
word 'ethical': 'because this indifference is not really a 
trait characterizing the manner in which one speaks 
and writes. but rather a kind of immanent rule, taken 
up over and over again. never fully applied, not 
designating writing as something completed, but domi-
nating it as a practice. '43 This 'immanent rule' can be 
illustrated through two of its major themes: (a) having 
'freed itself from the dimension of expression', writing 
is now about 'creating a space into which the writing 
subject constantly disappears', and (b) 'writing's rela-
tionship with death ... The work, which once had the 
duty of providing immortality now possesses the right 
to kill. to be it's author's murderer, as in the case of 
Flaubert. Proust and Kafka. That is not all. however.' 
Foucault concludes. · ... using all the contrivances that 
he sets up between himself and what he writes. the 
writing subject cancels out the signs of his particular 
individuality ... he must assume the role of the dead 
man in the game of writing. '44 
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Two insidious notions continue to interfere 
with this happening; one is the notion of 'a work', the 
other is that of 'writing'. These, 'intended to replace 
the privileged position of the author actually seem to 
preserve that privilege and suppress the real meaning 
of his disappearance'. 45 Also, 'it is not enough to keep 
repeating {after Nietzsche) that God and man have 
died a common death. Instead, we must locate the 
space left empty by the author's disappearance, follow 
the distributions of gaps and breaches, and watch for 
the openings thatthis disappearance uncovers. '46 One 
problem with the 'author function' for Foucault, in 
fact, is that it is hegemonic and ideological, it 'marks 
the manner in which we fear the proliferation of 
meaning. '47 So death to the author as well as the king 
and the universal intellectual! These are the figures 
Foucault wants eliminated from our future culture. 
The author is effaced by indifference; not eve-
ryone has the privilege to go mad! A more accessible 
form of dissolution, of 'opening out onto the world'. 
With the author's death 'all discourses, whatever their 
status, form, value, and whatever the treatment to 
which they are subjected, would then develop in the 
anonymity of a murmur. '48 We would be left, to return 
to the suggestive image with which Foucault ended 
The Order of Things, with the soft sound of the sea; a 
sea of 'polysemous texts' functioning within a different 
'system of constraint' which, like some future utopia, 
'will have to be determined or, perhaps, experienced. '19 
Foucault, in fact. does not advocate the end of writing 
but that of the author; what he advocates is a culture 
of authorless, unappropriated, polysemic texts - 'an 
anonymous text posted on a wall probably has a writer 
- but not an author. '50 But is he serious? A faceless 
culture of anonymous texts! Is this a scenario for 
utopia or another futuristic exercise in dystopian writ-
ing? 
How does his cultural and political anarchy 
coincide with Foucault's final turn to 'ethics' in his last 
phase of writing. Ethics'. Foucault says, is about 
'ascetical practice ... not in the sense of abnegation but 
that of an exercise of self upon self by which one tries 
to work out, to transform one's self and to attain a 
certain mode of being'. 51 Ethics is about care of the 
self, it is about self-creation, about constituting one's 
self as a self, one's life as a work of art. 52 For Foucault, 
this constituting of one's self as a self is to be achieved 
through writing: ' ... it is better to try to understand that 
someone who is a writer,' he said in his Roussel 
interview, 'is not simply doing his works in his books, 
in what he publishes, but that his major work is, in the 
end, himself in the process of writing his books. '53 Care 
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of self, he concludes in his final interview, perhaps 
effecting the last conscious synthesis of his work with 
his life, is 'like a movement to articulate one's exist-
ence to the point where there would be nothing else 
before it but the possibility of death. '54 This is the kind 
of articulation, he says, that Roussel himself suc-
ceeded in effecting towards the end of his life. Roussel' s 
gesture of suicide in Palermo should be read as his 
statement that 'the work must be set free from the 
person who wrote it. '55 So, what conclusion with 
regard to our question about remembering/forgetting 
Foucault? Foucault said that 'by treating him as an 
author like others', he would have felt that he was 
'betraying Roussel, normalizing him.' 56 Obviously, 
not having wished it on Roussel, this is not a fate he 
would have wanted for himself; anonymity is always 
preferable to normalization. Noting the comparatively 
scarce interest the book on Roussel had generated 
among his commentators he said, 'No one has paid 
much attention to this book, and I'm glad; it's my 
secret affair. You know, he was my love for several 
summers ... no one knew it. '57 Forgetting Foucault? 
Yes, if this means granting him the kind of anonymity 
he wanted; i.e., that of not being 'studied' or being 
represented as a 'figure', as an author. No, if he could 
be retained as 'a secret affair'; as a clandestine lover. 
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